This paper examines how industry structure affects corporate investment patterns. Real-options theory shows that deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty is valuable. Theory also shows that the value of waiting to invest falls if investment opportunities are contestable. Consistent with these theories, we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment-q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries. However, we find that investment-q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries, suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting. Indeed, oligopolistic industries experience less entry and more exit than other industries. 
I. Introduction
The value of real options and their optimal exercise are closely tied to industry structure.
For instance, although a firm with exclusive property rights to a risky investment opportunity will optimally delay costly adjustments and irreversible capital expenditures, the value of waiting is dissipated if other firms can divert the opportunity to themselves. 1 Aside from this wait-lose trade-off, firms might use investment strategically to deter entry, pre-empt rivals, or induce exit.
2
Although a large theoretical literature implicitly or explicitly relates real options to industry structure, empirical evidence remains scant. 3 This study provides the first direct broad-sample results on whether industry structure affects the exercise of real options by testing if industry concentration affects the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q or investment-timing patterns.
Our research design follows directly from Grenadier (2002) who shows that the level above which the stochastic state variable must rise to trigger investment falls with competition. Industry structure therefore affects the sensitivity and timing of investment by conditioning the probability that a change in the state variable will trigger investment. We test this hypothesis using two approaches, one rooted in the literature relating investment to Tobin's q, the other a duration analysis that addresses limitations of the first approach while corroborating its results.
Using Tobin's q as a proxy for the stochastic state variable and a Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure industry concentration, our first approach examines whether industry structure affects investment by estimating investment-q regressions on a large sample of U.S.
manufacturing firms. Consistent with a wait-lose trade-off, we find that investment by firms in high-concentration ("monopolistic") industries is about half as sensitive to changes in Tobin's q than investment by firms in low-concentration ("competitive") industries.
In contrast, but consistent with a strategic role for investment, we find that investment-q sensitivity is highest among firms in mid-concentration ("oligopolistic") industries. Firms in these industries also invest more than firms in competitive or monopolistic industries. These findings suggest that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting. The importance of strategic investment in oligopolistic industries is supported by our finding that these industries experience less entry and more exit than competitive or monopolistic industries.
Although this first approach links our work to the extensive investment-q literature, investment-q sensitivity might well reflect factors besides real options and strategic interaction.
For instance, recent papers show that market power lowers investment-q sensitivity in general (Cooper and Ejarque, 2001, Abel and Eberly, 2003) and that measurement error in Tobin's q can bias investment sensitivities (Erickson and Whited, 2000 , 2002 , Gomes, 2001 .
Therefore, as a second approach, we perform a duration analysis to avoid these interpretive and econometric problems and test directly how industry structure affects investment timing.
Consistent with the regression results, we find that when it comes to large investments (both for fixed and firm-specific investment cutoff levels), firms in competitive industries invest sooner than firms in monopolistic industries. Also consistent with our regression results, we find that firms in oligopolistic industries are quickest to invest and least likely to stage investment.
Alternatively, our findings could simply reflect differences in investment frictions. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index might sort industries on the basis of adjustment costs or investment irreversibility because these frictions pose barriers to entry and exit that in turn determine industry structure. We address this concern in several ways. First, we control for industry fixed effects, thus accounting for broad differences in investment frictions. Second, differential investment frictions would cause differences in the lumpiness of investment, yet we find no difference in the lumpiness of investment between competitive, oligopolistic, and monopolistic industries. Finally, we control for capital-intensity as a proxy for sunk costs and irreversibility.
This research also has implications for traditional areas of empirical investment analysis.
Industry structure is likely to affect investment-cash flow sensitivities if profitability increases in concentration. 4 Industry structure can also affect the variance of underlying risk factors and thereby the relation between investment and uncertainty. 5 Accordingly, we find that investment sensitivity to proxies for financial status and risk does indeed depend on industry concentration.
Ours is not the first paper to relate corporate investment to industry structure. Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991) , Sakellaris (1994) , Hay and Liu, (1998), and Cooper and Ejarque (2001) focus on optimization frameworks that accommodate imperfect competition and stress the empirical detection of market power. However, they do not examine whether conventional measures of industry structure can help explain corporate investment patterns. Ghosal and Loungani (1996) find that competition affects investment-risk sensitivity at the industry level.
Our study draws on recent theory that shows that industry structure affects firm-level investment not only through its effect on uncertainty but also via the equilibrium investment trigger levels.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we show that industry structure sheds new light on our understanding of corporate investment decisions. Our results show that the basic wait-lose trade-off suggested by standard and strategic real-options theories is borne out by the data.
Second, we show that strategic considerations beyond those reflected in the wait-lose trade-off also weigh into the equation. This is seen in oligopolistic industries, where investment is even more sensitive to Tobin's q and occurs sooner than in competitive industries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the relevant literature, empirical predictions, and research design. Section III describes data sources, variable construction, and sample selection. Section IV presents univariate statistics and investment-q regressions. Section V discusses alternative explanations for our regression results. Section VI presents our duration analysis. Section VII analyses industry structure and Section VIII concludes.
II. Real Options, Industry Structure, and Strategic Investment
This section reviews the literature relevant to our empirical predictions. We begin with the real-options literature pertaining to the optimal timing and size of irreversible investment. We then discuss strategic real-options studies that show how industry structure bears on investment policy. Because some of our results suggest that investment might also serve a strategic purpose, we survey the industrial organization literature related to strategic investment. Finally, we show how these distinct strands of literature combine to form a set of testable empirical hypotheses.
A. Review of the Literature
McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988) are among the first studies to use a contingent-claims framework to value the option to postpone costly capacity adjustments or irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty. McDonald and Siegel establish the value of waiting to invest by showing that, contrary to the standard NPV decision rule, investment should only proceed if the value of discounted cash flows exceeds the investment outlay by a certain positive amount: "The correct calculation involves comparing the value of investing today with the (present) value of investing at all possible times in the future." For reasonable parameter values, McDonald and Siegel estimate that firms should wait until the benefits are twice the costs before making irreversible investments. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) later canonize this view by noting: "Hence the simple NPV rule is not just wrong; it is often very wrong." Pindyck (1988) extends the McDonald-Siegel framework to endogeneize the size of capacity itself. Pindyck shows that although the expected marginal productivity of capital rises with uncertainty, rising uncertainty increases the value of waiting by an even greater amount.
The net effect is to lower the optimal size of capacity relative to a deterministic setting. Thus, these papers show that uncertainty lowers irreversible investment in two ways. First, the value of waiting causes firms to defer investing in a given project until uncertainty is resolved. Second, uncertainty lowers investment by reducing the optimal size of risky projects.
Closely tied to this literature are papers that study the staging of investment, such as Baldwin (1982) , Majd and Pindyck (1987), and Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2003) . These papers consider the case where investment proceeds in sequential increments rather than being strictly discrete (McDonald and Siegel, 1986) or perfectly scalable (Pindyck, 1988) . Their central message is that the arrival of intervening information allows firms to adjust their investment program midstream. Good news leads firms to accelerate or ramp up investment; bad news leads them to decelerate, scale down, or even abandon ongoing investment projects. These possibilities expand the firm's portfolio of real options but also affect the value of its other real options. For instance, the ability to make interim adjustments assuredly lowers the value of waiting and changes initial capacity size compared to when such adjustments are not possible.
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The papers reviewed so far offer a unified message, namely, that investment frictions tend to slow the pace and lower the size of investment under uncertainty. A maintained assumption of this literature is that firms hold exclusive property rights to their real options which amounts to assuming that firms face strictly exogenous stochastic state variables. This assumption fails, however, if own-firm investment returns interact with rivals' investment returns. Dixit (1989) , Williams (1993) , Caballero and Pindyck (1996 ), and Grenadier (1996 , 2002 show how these interactions arise in a dynamic industry setting where investment returns reflect inter-firm rivalry and inter-temporal dependence. Under this scenario, the state variables are endogenous, which calls into question the partial-equilibrium results derived in the standard real-options literature.
Recent real-options models address these concerns by incorporating strategic interaction.
For instance, Williams (1993) , Baldursson (1998) , Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998 ), Grenadier (1996 , 2002 ), and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003 Trigeorgis (1996) investigates the value effects of real-option interactions. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) examine the scope firms have to withdraw by temporarily shutting down operations or eventually abandoning productive capacity. Triantis and Hodder (1990) refine the analysis to model real flexibility within ongoing manufacturing operations. Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996) analyze the joint role of fixed adjustment costs and partial irreversibility. Finally, Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck (1996) generalize the real-options approach to the case where both the postponement of investment and capacity-in-place are only partially irreversible.
competitors." However, Leahy (1993) shows that rival action may actually not affect equilibrium investment behavior, underscoring the need for empirical verification.
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The strategic real-options literature establishes a first linkage between investment policy and industry structure where, by depressing the value of real options, strategic factors can restore the decision rules and investment patterns prevailing under certainty. Even under certainty, industrial organization theory suggests other reasons why strategic interaction might cause investment behavior to deviate from partial-equilibrium policies. Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) exemplify this broad literature on strategic investment. 8 These papers develop a strategic role for investment where, by investing in fixed capacity, research and development, or advertising campaigns, incumbents credibly commit to compete aggressively in the product market. This posturing can keep out aspiring entrants, induce rivals to relinquish market share or forgo expansion, and cause marginal players to exit. However, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) show that under some circumstances, rather than this "fat-cat effect", the best strategy is for incumbents to maintain a "lean and hungry look" by investing sparingly. Thus, investing strategically could mean over-investing or under-investing relative to partial-equilibrium investment levels.
B. Empirical Predictions and Research Design
The literature offers straightforward predictions and suggests a simple research design.
First, the standard real-options literature shows that there is value in postponing investment.
Second, the strategic real-options literature shows that competition might compromise this value.
This wait-lose trade-off suggests that the value of waiting is highest in monopolistic industries, 7 Similarly, Pindyck (1993) cautions that "in a competitive market, the key interactions between irreversibility and uncertainty occur at the industry level and can only be understood by making price and industry output endogenous. Doing so restores the positive opportunity cost associated with irreversible investment." 8 Others include Eaton and Lipsey (1979 , 1980 , 1981 and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983 , 1984 where firms are presumably least likely to lose investment opportunities to competitors. Thus, the wait-lose trade-off implies that the value of waiting increases with industry concentration.
The strategic investment literature puts an important qualification on this first implication.
Specifically, in addition to the wait-lose trade-off, firms also weigh the gains from strategic investment aimed at defending market share and their real-option portfolios. These factors could yield richer results than the linear relation implied by standard and strategic real-options theories.
We test these implications using two approaches, one relying on investment-q sensitivity, the other examining investment timing. Both approaches follow directly from Grenadier (2002) who shows that the level above which the stochastic state variable must rise to trigger investment falls with competition. We motivate and explain each approach in turn.
First, Grenadier's result implies that competition raises the sensitivity of investment to the state variable by raising the probability that a change in the state variable will trigger investment.
We show this formally in the Appendix where we establish that the expected sensitivity of investment to the state variable increases with the number of firms in the industry. This result holds whenever investment is increasing in the state variable which is the conventional realoptions assumption, and one that is known to hold for Tobin's q, our proxy for the state variable. Thus, our first approach is to regress investment on Tobin's q and examine if industry concentration affects investment-q sensitivity. According to the wait-lose trade-off, the value of 9 Our choice of Tobin's q as a proxy for the state variable is based on two considerations. First, Tobin's q is widely accepted as the theoretically-sound measure of the desirability of investment and is commonly used in the empirical investment literature (e.g. Hayashi, 1982 , Gomes, 2001 . Recent theory (Caballero and Leahy, 1996 , Caballero, 1999 , and especially Abel and Eberly, 2003 even favors observable average q ("Tobin's q") over the unobservable marginal q. Second, because it is constructed from market value, Tobin's q reflects the arrival of new information regarding the desirability of investment and thus evolves stochastically. Abel and Eberly (2003) formalize this view by showing how average q depends on stochastic capital depreciation rates and profit growth.
waiting is highest in monopolistic industries and lowest in competitive industries. As discussed, this implies that investment-q sensitivity should decrease in industry concentration. But if the value of investing strategically offsets the value of waiting, investment-q sensitivity could exhibit no significant relation to industry structure or even increase in industry concentration.
We use duration analysis as a second approach to testing the empirical predictions. There are two benefits to doing so. First, the link to theory is immediate: Industry structure affects investment timing by affecting optimal waiting time. Duration analysis allows us to model investment timing directly. Second, it allows us to determine whether factors other than real options and strategic interaction are driving our regression results. Specifically, industry concentration might lower investment-q sensitivity because of the market-power argument developed in Cooper and Ejarque (2001) and Abel and Eberly (2003) or estimation bias caused by measurement error in Tobin's q (see Erickson and Whited, 2000 , 2002 , and Gomes, 2001 ).
Duration analysis avoids Tobin's q altogether and therefore allows us to determine whether the posited hypothesis or these alternative economic and econometric factors explain our results.
We therefore estimate a proportional hazards model that enables us to examine investment timing patterns and their determinants as a function of industry concentration. form industry-concentration sub-samples that we refer to as low, mid, and high-concentration industries. For brevity, we also refer to these as competitive, oligopolistic, and monopolistic industries although we make no claim that these low, mid, and high-concentration industries closely match textbook definitions of competitive, oligopolistic, and monopolistic industries.
B. Controls and Variable Construction
The empirical finance literature on corporate investment usually focuses either on the role of financial status or the effect of uncertainty. 11 Whether or how financial status bears on investment is unresolved. 12 The effect that uncertainty has on investment is also debated, both theoretically (Caballero, 1991 , Pindyck, 1993 , and Sakellaris, 1994 , and empirically (Sakellaris, 1995 , Leahy and Whited, 1996 , Minton and Schrand, 1999 , and Andrade and Stafford, 2004 .
Consequently, our investment regressions include financial status and risk proxies as controls.
We use the following proxies for financial status: cash flow, cash holdings, financial leverage, and firm size. Cash flow and firm size are common in the investment-finance literature.
However, as Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) imply and Whited (2005) shows, a firm's 11 Industrial economists were initially interested in the adjustment cost function, first assuming convex adjustment costs (Hayashi, 1982 , Whited, 1992 , Bond and Meghir, 1994 then admitting fixed costs (Abel and Eberly, 1994 , Barnett and Sakellaris, 1998 , Doyle and Whited, 2001 . See Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for a survey. 12 Fazzari et al. (1988) , Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) , and others find an inverse relation between investment and cash flow which they attribute to the wedge between the cost of internal and external funds caused by information asymmetry. In contrast, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) find that the investment of exante financially-constrained firms is less sensitive to cash flow than the investment of ex-ante financially unconstrained firms. Whited (2000, 2002) and Gomes (2001) show that accounting for measurement error in Tobin's q restores the independence of investment and cash flow. However, Caballero and Leahy (1996) , Alti (2003), and Abel and Eberly (2003) show that investment can depend on cash flow even in the absence of financial constraints. Lastly, Whited (2005) finds that financial constraints lower the probability of investment.
stock of liquid assets and debt financing can also condition its investment. We therefore include cash holdings and financial leverage as additional proxies for financial status.
These variables are constructed as follows. Following Minton and Schrand (1999), Whited (2005) , and Andrade and Stafford (2004), we measure investment as capital expenditures in property, plant, and equipment normalized by lagged total assets. As in MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Tobin's q is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred taxes, all divided by total assets.
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Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), we define cash flow as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation (minus dividends) to total assets, cash holdings as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets, and firm size as the natural logarithm of total assets. We measure financial leverage as total debt divided by total assets.
As proxies for risk we use: cash flow volatility, diversification, and capital-intensity. We measure cash flow volatility as the standard deviation of cash flow divided by total assets using up to ten (minimum four) annual observations. We measure diversification as one minus the Herfindahl of sales across a firm's four-digit SIC industries (computed from segment data). This measure equals zero for single-segment firms and tends to one for multi-segment firms. We use fixed-capital stock (net property, plant, and equipment, in $ millions) divided by the number of employees as a proxy for capital intensity (the capital-labor ratio). Although we view the capitallabor ratio as a proxy for risk ("operating leverage"), it could also reflect real-side flexibility, following the interpretation given by Leahy and Whited (1996) and Mackay (2003) . 13 Alternatively, following Alti (2003) and others, we repeat the analysis using net property, plant, and equipment as a divisor for investment and Tobin's q instead of total assets. We find no material difference in results.
Finally, our multivariate analyses control for two-digit and year fixed effects. These fixed effects help control for industry or secular shocks and other factors that might enter the firm's optimization problem but escape the analyst. In particular, year effects account for changes in the risk-free rate over time and industry effects help minimize the possibility that the HHI merely reflects differences in investment frictions across industries. Note that controlling for capitalintensity as a proxy for sunk costs and irreversibility also serves to alleviate the latter concern.
C. Sample Selection
As in most studies on fixed-capacity investment, we limit the sample to firms in manufacturing industries (SIC 2000-3999) . Another reason for this restriction is that the Census of Manufacturers' HHI is only available for manufacturing industries. We exclude firms in industries classified as miscellaneous by dropping industries where the last two digits of the fourdigit SIC code end in ninety-nine. This limits the sample to well-defined industries.
Some studies drop all observations where any of the data are missing. We find that in many cases, although investment is missing, data do exist for the other variables. Thus, rather than exclude such observations from the sample, we set the investment variable to zero in such cases.
However, setting investment to zero when it is missing introduces left-censoring into the sample, which can bias our regression estimates. To guard against this, we re-estimate all our models by excluding these imputed values. We also estimate unreported Tobit regressions. Neither of these alternative approaches makes a material difference in our results or the conclusions of the study.
We delete observations with negative sales, assets, or investment, and those with a CRSP permanent number equal to zero. Influential observations are removed as follows. We drop observations where Tobin's q is over ten, asset-normalized cash flow is less (more) than negative (positive) two, and asset-normalized cash holdings or financial leverage lie outside the [0, 1] interval. 14 Finally, we trim the sample by excluding observations in the ninety-ninth percentiles for Tobin's q and asset-normalized investment, cash flow, and cash flow volatility.
The regressions presented in Section IV mitigate endogeneity bias by using lagged values of the regressors as instruments. We also perform a duration analysis requiring several years of data for each firm-year. We therefore require that each firm-year have at least three years of lagged data. 15 The final sample consists of three unbalanced sub-samples comprising 4,242 firms Table 1 reports summary statistics for the industry concentration sub-samples. Although most of the variables differ statistically across these sub-samples, we note only a few economically significant differences between firms in each type of industry. Median investment rates are 4.2%, 4.9%, and 4.3% for low, mid, and high-concentration industries. In other words, the relation between investment and industry concentration is non-monotonic, with firms in midconcentration industries investing about 13% more than firms in low or high-concentration industries, but no detectable difference between firms in low or high-concentration industries.
IV. Results

A. Univariate Analysis
Mean Tobin's q is statistically higher in high-concentration than in mid-concentration industries (1.643 and 1.548), however, the medians (1.283 and 1.286) are indistinguishable. We find substantially higher mean and median Tobin's q for high-concentration than lowconcentration industries (1.643 versus 1.566 and 1.283 versus 1.243), consistent with greater market power and economic rents accruing to firms in monopolistic industries. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that median cash flow (profitability) is greater in highconcentration than low-concentration industries (0.064 versus 0.059).
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these findings is the lack of variation in the levels of most variables across industry sub-samples. However, as the following analysis shows, although similar equilibrium outcomes might arise across these broad industry types, industry structure does bear directly on the relation between investment and its determinants. Table 2 reports GMM investment-q regression results for low, mid, and high-concentration industries. 16 For robustness, in addition to the DOJ cutoffs (Model B), this table also examines the sensitivity of the results to variations in the concentration cutoff scheme by broadening the mid-concentration category to 800 ≤ HHI < 2000 (Model A) and narrowing it to 1200 ≤ HHI < 1600 (Model C). These variants are centered on the DOJ cutoffs of 1000 ≤ HHI < 1800. The key results across these variants are quite similar so we frame our discussion in terms of the base case, the DOJ cutoffs (Model B), and note differences for Models A and C as necessary. 16 To facilitate interpretation and comparisons within and across models, we standardize the variables by subtracting the sample mean from each observation and then dividing this result by the sample standard deviation. The resulting regression coefficients show how investment responds (in standard-deviation units) to a one-standard deviation change in each regressor, holding all other regressors constant at the sample mean. This transformation also explains why no intercept is included in the regressions. Another reason is that we control for industry and year fixed effects by demeaning the variables. As a result, our coefficients on q might appear high. However, the coefficients reported in most other studies are non-standardized and therefore not directly comparable to ours.
B. Multivariate Regression Analysis
Each model shows results for an investment-q equation estimated with the set of controls for firm financial status and risk described earlier. In all three sub-samples (low, mid, and highconcentration) our results show similarities with those reported in extant empirical work. For instance, despite its theoretical foundation as a "sufficient statistic" for investment, we find that Tobin's q is not the only significant regressor: Many control variables are statistically significant.
The coefficients for Tobin's q (0.205, 0.327, and 0.098 for low, mid, and high concentration industries) are substantially lower than the coefficients for cash flow (0.601, 0.517, and 0.337).
These results concur with the importance usually ascribed to finance in explaining investment.
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C. Investment-q Sensitivity and Industry Structure Table 2 shows that the investment-q sensitivities differ statistically and economically across all three sub-samples. Comparing low-concentration and high-concentration industry subsamples, we find investment-q sensitivities of 0.205 and 0.098, indicating that firms in lowconcentration industries are twice as responsive to variations in the investment opportunity set (Tobin's q) as firms in high-concentration industries. This result is robust to the concentration cutoff schemes corresponding to Models A and C. These findings support the wait-lose trade-off hypothesis that firms in monopolistic industries are better able to defer investment until additional uncertainty is resolved than are firms in competitive industries.
Another possible explanation for why firms in high-concentration industries might respond less to Tobin's q is that they face higher adjustment costs or investment irreversibilities. 18 These frictions would result in lumpier, more volatile investment time patterns. However, Table 1 shows that the standard deviation of investment is actually somewhat lower for highconcentration industries and unreported ANOVA results show no difference in within-firm variation in investment across low and high-concentration industries. 19 The regressions also include two-digit SIC industry dummies to account for industry-specific investment frictions.
These factors would seem to rule out differential investment frictions as a potential explanation. Table 2 shows a clear break from the monotonic relation between industry concentration and investment-q sensitivity implied by the wait-lose trade-off hypothesis. Specifically, we find that investment-q sensitivity is highest for firms in mid-concentration industries, where the coefficient estimate for Model B is 0.327 (0.301 and 0.335 for Models A and C). Thus, rather than falling somewhere between the investment-q sensitivity of low and high-concentration industries, we find that investment in mid-concentration industries is roughly 60% and 234% more sensitive to Tobin's q than it is in low and high-concentration industries.
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What is less clear is why investment is most sensitive to Tobin's q in mid-concentration industries. Theory suggests two strategy-based explanations. First, strategic real-options theory stresses a reactive explanation where the threat of losing opportunities to rivals prompts ownfirm investment. Second, industrial organization theory stresses a proactive explanation where own-firm investment is used to affect rivals' investment. Although it might not be possible to disentangle them empirically, both explanations point to the importance of strategic interaction. 19 We also develop a measure of investment lumpiness and find no difference across industry sub-samples (Table 7) . 20 An earlier version of this study established that investment-q sensitivity is non-monotonic in HHI by reporting combined-sample regressions using interactions of Tobin's q and HHI in addition to sub-sample regressions. Thus, the inverted-U relation we document between investment and industry concentration is quite robust.
The reactive explanation holds that the value of delaying risky investment falls rapidly if other firms can divert investment opportunities to themselves. This would hardly apply to firms in monopolistic industries, where various factors conspire to soften competition and afford them more time to develop and exercise options at their leisure. It might also not fully apply to firms in competitively-structured industries where no single firm holds enough sway to threaten the opportunities facing other industry participants. Where strategic interaction might really matter to investment is between these polar extremes, where firms hold neither enough nor too little market power to ignore or be ignored by other industry participants. Firms in such industries surely have overlapping opportunity sets and find that, in a non-cooperative environment, firstmover advantage is crucial and outweighs the value of delaying risky investment. This could explain why investment-q sensitivity is greatest in mid-concentration, oligopolistic industries.
The proactive explanation offered by industrial organization theory holds that incumbents might invest strategically to deter entry, pre-empt rivals, or induce exit. Such attempts are not germane to competitive industries. Even in monopolistic industries, exogenous factors might explain and perpetuate the status quo and lessen the value of strategic action. Oligopolistic industries are arguably where strategic action holds most appeal because the degree of competition, if not the industry structure itself, is bound to be more malleable and thus invite strategic investment aimed at deterrence, pre-emption, or predation. We later examine the strategic interaction hypothesis by analyzing industry contestability and entry and exit rates. Table 2 offers new insights on how investment relates to a firm's financial status. First, we learn that investment is significantly less cash-flow sensitive in high-concentration industries than in low-concentration industries. This result is consistent with the finding that investment-q sensitivity is higher in low-concentration industries: The more pressed a (financially constrained) firm is to invest, the more sensitive its investment will be to the availability of internal funds.
The effect of cash holdings and firm size on investment also depends on industry concentration. In particular, although investment is not significantly related to cash holdings in low concentration industries, it is inversely related to cash holdings in high-concentration industries; this inverse relation is even more pronounced in mid-concentration industries. 21 Also, investment increases in firm size in low-concentration industries but is insignificantly related to firm size in mid and high-concentration industries. Table 2 also sheds new light on how investment relates to uncertainty. However, these findings are quite sensitive to the concentration cutoff scheme (Models A, B, or C). First, we find a significant positive relation between investment and cash-flow volatility in low-concentration industries. This relation is generally insignificant outside these industries and most differences in investment-risk sensitivities across the sub-samples are not statistically significant.
Based on Model B, we find that investment is three (two) times more negatively related to diversification in mid-concentration than in low (high)-concentration industries. This result is interesting in that the mean firm in mid-concentration industries is substantially less diversified (0.244) than the mean firm in either low or high-concentration industries (0.284 and 0.302),
suggesting that equilibrium forces might lead to less diversification in oligopolistic industries.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show how such an equilibrium might operate. They find that when managerial talent is limited or industry-specific, single-segment firms are more productive 21 Fazzari and Petersen (1993) offer a clue to this counter-intuitive result. They find an inverse relation between fixed-capital investment and working-capital investment, suggesting that working capital competes with fixed capital for a limited pool of internal finance. Given that the imperative for investment appears stronger in midconcentration industries, it seems possible that, if anywhere, a substitution effect between real-side investment and cash holdings would surface in these industries.
than conglomerates of the same size. Thus, although higher investment in mid-concentration industries might be strategically motivated, to be sustainable, higher investment must also reflect higher productivity. As Maksimovic and Phillips show, one way to raise productivity is by specializing. These factors could therefore translate into the observed lower diversification and greater inverse relation between investment and diversification in mid-concentration industries.
Finally, Table 2 shows that industry concentration affects investment, even within industryconcentration sub-samples. This relation is sensitive to the concentration cutoff scheme (Models A, B, or C) but supports our argument that industry structure matters to investment patterns.
D. Investment-q Sensitivity and Changes in Industry Structure
Our analysis so far stresses the cross-sectional differences in investment-q sensitivities between low, mid, and high-concentration industries. Although we control for industry and year fixed effects, a more direct -and demanding -test is to examine whether changes in the concentration level of a given industry over time are associated with changes in investment-q sensitivities that are consistent with our cross-sectional results. We therefore extend the analysis by exploiting the time-series dimension of the panel.
Tracking a given industry over time is problematic because the small number of firms in most industries results in low statistical power and inconclusive tests. Thus, failure to detect a statistical relation between investment-q sensitivity and industry concentration could mean that the economic relation is truly lacking or that the relation exists but is statistically undetectable.
We therefore conduct our time-series tests on groups of industries rather than single industries.
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22 We also considered analyzing the change in investment-q sensitivity for industries that reclassify concentration category (low, mid, or high concentration) between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 . However, the number of firmyears associated with reclassifying industries is again too low to draw conclusions. We consider two measures of industry evolution. First, we divide the sample into two ten-year periods, 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 , and calculate the log-change in the average HHI for each four-digit SIC industry between these two periods. 23 Second, we measure industry contestability as the coefficient of variation in HHI, i.e., the standard deviation of each four-digit SIC industry's HHI divided by the industry's average HHI from 1981 to 2000. Table 3 shows that manufacturing industries became more concentrated between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 (mean and median HHI changes of 5.7% and 4.5%). The table also shows substantial variation in the evolution undergone by low, mid, and high-concentration industries.
We find that the respective mean changes in HHI are 9.5%, -0.2%, and -11.2%, all different at the 5% confidence level, suggesting a convergence toward oligopolistic industry structures.
However, the corresponding median changes, 6.8%, -1.3%, and 0.0%, support the overall finding that manufacturing industries generally consolidated between 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 . Table 3 also shows that mean industry contestability is statistically higher in lowconcentration industries than in high-concentration industries (18.7% versus 13.7%) but highest in mid-concentration industries (23.8%). To the extent that our contestability measure reflects strategic pressures, these patterns support our conjecture that the high investment-q sensitivity observed for mid-concentration industries points to a strategic role for investment. 1981-1990 or 1991-2000) . These results generally support our earlier findings.
23 Some industries drop out of the sample because they only appear in one of these periods.
For low-concentration industries, we find that investment-q sensitivity rises both when concentration increases (from 0.151 to 0.221) and decreases (from 0.089 to 0.335), although only the latter difference is statistically significant. These results reflect the offsetting forces identified earlier. First, the wait-lose trade-off appears to prevail when industry concentration falls, causing firms in increasingly-competitive industries to become even more responsive to Tobin's q.
Second, strategic considerations appear to prevail when industry concentration rises, causing firms in decreasingly-competitive industries to also become more responsive to Tobin's q.
The interplay of the wait-lose trade-off and strategic considerations is also apparent in midconcentration industries, where increased competition (lower HHI) coincides with statistically lower investment-q sensitivity (from 0.533 to 0.300) -evidence that strategic pressures to invest subside as competition rises. Conversely, decreased competition (higher HHI) coincides with statistically higher investment-q sensitivity (from a non-significant -0.086 to a highly significant 0.255) -evidence that strategic pressures to invest mount as competition falls.
Other than corroborating the low investment responsiveness noted earlier, results for the high-concentration industry sub-panels are inconclusive because the investment-q sensitivities are neither statistically different than zero nor different across time periods. However, the statistical power associated with these sub-panels is limited on account of their small size.
V. Alternative Explanations
Although the results of Section IV link our work to the extensive investment-q literature, investment-q sensitivity might well reflect factors besides real options and strategic interaction.
This section discusses alternative economic and econometric explanations for the results reported so far and motivates the duration-analysis approach presented in Section VI.
Hayashi (1982) shows that average and marginal q coincide under perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and quadratic adjustment costs. Hayashi demonstrates that marginal q is always less than average q when the profit function is concave, such as when firms have market power. The fact that the gap between marginal and average q increases in industry concentration suggests two alternative explanations for our results, one economic and one econometric.
First, Cooper and Ejarque (2001) and Abel and Eberly (2003) show an economic linkage between industry structure and investment-q sensitivity by demonstrating that market power (or non-constant returns to scale) leads to strict concavity of the profit function which in turn lowers investment-q sensitivity. Thus, the difference in investment-q sensitivity we find across low and high-concentration industries could reflect this market-power argument rather than the wait-lose trade-off. Even so, this alternative explanation still assigns an important role to industry structure in explaining investment. However, like the wait-lose trade-off, this alternative explanation fails to explain why investment-q sensitivity is highest in mid-concentration industries.
Second, Whited (2000, 2002) and Gomes (2001) show that measurement error in Tobin's q can bias estimated investment-q sensitivity. Thus, another explanation for our findings is that measurement error in Tobin's q increases as industry concentration rises and marginal q dips ever further below average q. Because this measurement error is non-classical in that it correlates with industry concentration, the resulting bias in estimation is non-signable.
Given this ambiguity in how to interpret the results, we consider two alternative estimation methods. One possibility is to run measurement-error robust regressions as outlined in Whited (2000, 2002 rather that the real-options wait-lose trade-off is the driving force behind our results.
The other method we consider is duration analysis. As we show in the next section, this method bypasses q entirely and thus avoids the related measurement and interpretation problems.
VI. Duration Analysis
To allay concerns with measuring Tobin's q and how to interpret investment-q sensitivity, this section presents a multivariate duration analysis as an alternative, semi-parametric approach that addresses the main questions of the paper by modeling investment timing directly, without relying on Tobin's q. This estimation method is known as a proportional hazards model. 25 Table 5 shows proportional hazards model estimates for three fixed investment thresholds (5%, 10%, and 15%) within the low, mid, and high-concentration industry sub-samples. We use multiple thresholds both as a robustness check and to allow for the possibility that the wait-lose 24 The i.i.d. requirement might hold within industry-concentration sub-samples even though it fails across them. However, the fact that the HHI is significant within each sub-sample suggests that this is not the case and the Erickson-Whited technique would still be inappropriate in the context of each industry-concentration sub-sample. 25 This is the approach used by Leary and Roberts (2005) to analyze financial rebalancing and Whited (2005) to analyze how financial status affects investment. These papers contain detailed descriptions and technical appendices on duration analysis and proportional hazards modeling. To conserve space, we refer the interested reader to those papers, or the text by Kalbfleish and Prentice (2002) , for further insight on these methods.
trade-off depends on the size of investment considered. We use a four-year investment horizon to ensure comparability with the regression results presented earlier.
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The proportional hazards model contains two types of estimates. The first type, shown at the bottom of Table 5 , are baseline hazard rates. The n th -year hazard rate is the probability that a firm will exceed the investment threshold in the current year conditional on it not having exceeded the threshold in the previous n-1 years. The set of hazard rates defines the hazard function. These hazard rates are computed by tracking the number of firms that do or do not exceed the threshold at each point of the investment horizon. The procedure accounts for rightcensoring in the data which occurs when a firm has not exceeded the threshold by the end of the investment horizon. This is important here since we only use a four-year horizon. Our use of a four-year window also introduces left-censoring which is also accommodated by the procedure.
The estimation is maximum likelihood and, as in Leary and Roberts (2005) and Whited (2005) , controls for unobserved heterogeneity using a gamma-distributed multiplicative term.
The second type of estimates are shift parameters. These show whether a given variable moves the baseline hazard rates up or down, and by how much. Consistent with our regressions, our covariates include industry and year dummy variables. Our covariates are time-varying but lagged to alleviate endogeneity (lagging twice yields similar results). A Chi-squared test on the related standard error indicates whether the shift parameter is statistically different from zero.
26 Unlike Whited (2005) , who uses a ten-year horizon, our objective is not to fully characterize a long-run hazard function but rather to examine, within a given broad sample, whether industry structure affects investment hazard rates in a manner consistent with our regression results. Also, as Whited (2005) points out, because the number of firms that go for long spells without investing is low, long-dated hazard rates estimates tend to be imprecise.
A. Investment Timing and Industry Structure
Turning first to the baseline hazard rates, Table 5 shows statistically and economically significant differences between low and high-concentration industries where, except for the 5% investment threshold, all three hazard rates are higher for low-concentration industries. Thus, in addition to our earlier finding that firms in competitive industries exhibit greater investment-q sensitivity, we find that when it comes to large investment projects, these firms also tend to invest sooner than firms in high-concentration industries. These findings provide some assurance that our regression results are not simply an artifact of measurement error in Tobin's q.
We also find that firms in mid-concentration industries invest much sooner than firms in low or high-concentration industries. However, Table 5 shows that although this pattern is statistically and economically significant for the 5% investment thresholds, mid-concentration industry hazard rates converge to those of low-concentration industries for the 10% and especially the 15% investment thresholds. This result suggests a strategic role for incremental investment in mid-concentration industries, where firms might be attempting to defend market share by making continuous, small investments rather than occasional large investments. 27 The similarity in hazard rates at the 10% and 15% thresholds for low and mid-concentration industries suggests that large investments are driven by common, non-strategic considerations.
Following Whited (2005) , Table 6 repeats the duration analysis using firm-specific medianinvestment multiples rather than the fixed thresholds used in Table 5 . Although the proportional hazards models in both tables control for two-digit SIC industry and year, we report these results to account for the possibility that finer, unobservable differences in technology or industry maturity could cause the definition of "large" investment to vary substantially across industries. Table 6 confirms the results of Table 5 . First, we find that hazard rates are higher in lowconcentration industries than in high-concentration industries and that the differences are statistically significant for higher investment thresholds (two and three-times firm-median investment) but not for the lowest investment threshold (single-median investment). Second, we find that hazard rates are highest in mid-concentration industries, although only for the singlemedian investment threshold. In other words, we continue to find support for the wait-lose tradeoff in that firms in monopolistic industries invest slower than firms in competitive industries and support for an overriding strategic role of investment in that firms in oligopolistic industries are quickest to invest overall.
As for the effect of the covariates themselves, we find that some of the shift parameters are sensitive to the type of investment threshold. For instance, based on fixed-investment thresholds (Table 5) , we find that cash flow raises the hazard function at every threshold level and in every sub-sample. However, based on firm-specific investment thresholds (Table 6) , we find that cash flow lowers the hazard function for the two highest thresholds (two and three-times firm-median investment). Thus, although the type of investment threshold (fixed or firm-specific) does not change our conclusions on the effect of industry structure on investment, the same cannot be said for the sensitivity of investment to financial status and uncertainty. Additionally, some shift parameters are sensitive to the level of investment threshold, suggesting that financial status and uncertainty affect investment differently depending on the magnitude of investment considered.
B. Robustness Checks
Whited (2005) shows that asynchronous decision making across business units within firms can lower estimated hazard rates by smoothing firm-level investment. This aggregation bias would naturally rise with the number of business units within a firm. Thus, given the difference in diversification levels across firms in low, mid, and high-concentration industries, the differences we document between the hazard rates of the industry sub-samples might simply reflect varying levels of aggregation bias. To investigate this possibility, we repeat the duration analysis on a sample consisting of single-segment firms only. Consistent with an asynchronous aggregation bias, our (unreported) results show that excluding multi-segment firms raises all hazard rates considerably: by 11% on average for low-concentration industries, 23% for midconcentration industries, and 16% for high-concentration industries. However, the pattern of results across industry sub-samples is essentially unchanged and our conclusions still stand.
We purposely exclude Tobin's q from Tables 5 and 6 because the main reason we turn to duration analysis is to avoid problems in measuring Tobin's q and interpreting investment-q sensitivity. Unreported results show that adding Tobin's q has little bearing on the analysis.
Whited (2005) uses sales growth an alternative proxy for the investment opportunity set. Just as for Tobin's q, we find that adding this variable to the model does not change our conclusions.
VII. Industry Structure and the Strategic Role of Investment
Although the differences in investment-q sensitivity and hazard rates between low and high-concentration industries conform to the predictions of the real-options literature, investment behavior in mid-concentration industries is strikingly distinct. We have argued that strategic factors might drive firms in mid-concentration industries to invest more and sooner than firms in low or high-concentration industries. This section examines whether the data support this claim.
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As discussed earlier, theory shows a strategic role for investment in deterring entry, preempting rivals, or inducing exit. If such investment achieves the purported strategic effect, then we might observe differences in entry and exit rates across low, mid, and high-concentration industries beyond those explained by natural barriers to entry and exit. To the extent that natural barriers cause industry concentration, we expect monopolistic industries to exhibit lower entry and exit rates than competitive industries. However, if strategic interaction truly dominates in oligopolistic industries, we could observe significant departures from such a monotonic relation. 28 Gilbert and Lieberman (1987 ), Lieberman (1987a , 1987b , 1990 , Christensen and Caves (1997) , Hay and Liu (1998), and Ghosal (2004) all report evidence of strategic investment behavior in manufacturing industries. 29 Data limitations prevent us from precisely determining the type of firm entry. For instance, we cannot distinguish between privately-held incumbents that go public and new firms that actually add productive capacity to their industry. By tracking firms by their CRSP permanent number (permno) rather than by their COMPUSTAT CUSIP, we avoid miss-classifying firms that undergo mergers and acquisitions or name changes as entrants. By using the historical SIC from CRSP rather than the current SIC from COMPUSTAT, we can identify incumbent firms that change industry. Thus, we refer to firms that change two-digit SIC industry between the 1981-1990 and 1991-2000 sub-periods as "switchers". Finally, thanks to COMPUSTAT's "reason for deletion" variable (footnote 35), we are able to distinguish between firms that exit through Chapter 11 bankruptcy or Chapter 7 liquidation ("exiters") and those whose assets are simply redeployed through corporate restructuring ("sellers").
The results support a strategic role for investment in mid-concentration industries.
Incumbency rates do not differ significantly across the sub-samples. However, entry (exit) rates are statistically and economically lower (higher) in mid-concentration industries than in low and high-concentration industries. We find entry rates of 4.49% in mid-concentration and 8.01%
(8.67%) in low(high)-concentration industries. Switching rates are less dispersed, but the corresponding total entry rates (entrant plus switcher rates) are 13.28% and 16.65% (19.05%).
Exit rates are equally informative and also support a strategic role for investment in midconcentration industries. Exiters form 1.73% of the mid-concentration industry sub-sample but only 1.14% and 0.63% of the low and high-concentration industries. More telling are the differences in seller rates, which are 14.08% in mid-concentration but 10.63% (9.49%) in low(high)-concentration industries. The corresponding total exit rates (exiter plus seller rates) are 15.82% and 11.78% (10.12%). Although these entry and exit rates do not prove strategic intent, they are consistent with a greater role for entry deterrence and induced exit in oligopolistic industries. They are also consistent with the industry contestability patterns reported in Table 3 . Table 7 also shows that incumbents in mid-concentration industries invest more (0.061) than incumbents in either low or high-concentration industries (0.053 and 0.054). Considering the lower entry and higher exit rates noted above, this finding is consistent with an enhanced role for strategic investment by incumbents in mid-concentration industries.
Entrants in low-concentration industries invest more (0.056) than incumbents (0.053) but entrants in mid-concentration industries invest less (0.052) than incumbents (0.061). This finding supports a pre-emptive role for investment where, through their own investment, incumbents in mid-concentration industries are able to discourage rivals' investment. Also consistent with this finding, mean Tobin's q for entrants in mid-concentration industries (1.783) is substantially lower than for comparable firms in low or high-concentration industries (1.996 and 2.010),
suggesting that financial markets are skeptical of entrants' ability to thrive in industries where incumbents pursue aggressive investment programs. Table 7 also examines investment time patterns. The first pattern we consider is the lumpiness of investment. We measure investment lumpiness for each firm-year by computing the standard deviation of the investment rate for the four most recent years. We find that entrant and exiter investment is substantially lumpier than the investment of incumbents. However, this pattern obtains in all three industry-concentration sub-samples and therefore does not offer new insights on why these sub-samples differ in other aspects of investment behavior.
Real-options theory suggests staging as another way firms can manage investment frictions in the face of uncertainty. Greater risk or investment frictions could lead to more staging, however, strategic pressures could accelerate investment and lead to less staging. We measure staging for each firm-year by computing the autocorrelation of the investment rate for the four most recent years. 30 We find that incumbents in mid-concentration industries stage statistically less than incumbents in low or high-concentration industries. This again supports the notion that strategic factors might spur incumbents in mid-concentration industries to accelerate investment.
Finally, Table 7 reports mean times until investment exceeds three thresholds (5%, 10%, and 15%). 31 Regardless of investment threshold, the quickest incumbents to invest are those in mid-concentration industries, followed by incumbents in high and low-concentration industries.
Although entrants in low-concentration industries are quicker to invest than incumbents, entrants 30 We compute this as the correlation between the first three years and the last three years of this four-year window. 31 Note that unlike the duration analysis, these mean investment times do not correct for right or left censoring.
in mid and high-concentration industries are slower to invest than incumbents. These differences in investment-timing patterns across firm types and industry concentration confirm that strategic factors can condition the relation between investment and industry structure.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper examines whether industry structure affects corporate investment patterns. Realoptions theory shows that the value of deferring irreversible investment in the face of uncertainty must be weighed against the threat of losing investment opportunities to competitors. Overlaying this basic wait-lose trade-off, industrial organization theory shows a strategic role for investment.
Consistent with these theories, we find that firms in monopolistic industries exhibit lower investment-q sensitivity and are slower to invest than firms in competitive industries. We also find that investment-q sensitivity and investment speed are highest in oligopolistic industries, suggesting that the value of investing strategically can outweigh the value of waiting.
Confirming the importance of strategic investment in oligopolistic industries, we find that these industries experience less entry and more exit than competitive or monopolistic industries.
Our regression results support alternative explanations, such as estimation bias caused by measurement error in Tobin's q or that market power generally lowers investment-q sensitivity.
However, our duration analysis addresses these concerns by bypassing Tobin's q and delivers a consistent set of results. From this we conclude that our findings are robust and cannot be solely attributed to measurement bias or a market-power argument of lowered investment-q sensitivity.
This research confirms that industry structure is a key determinant of corporate investment.
We show that accounting for industry concentration in investment regressions or duration models is important. Our results support many aspects of real-options and industrial organization theory.
At a broader level, our research identifies an important determinant of investment beyond the well-established roles of financial status and risk in shaping investment policy.
An extension to this research lies in the operation of internal capital markets. For instance, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and Whited (2005) show that productivity and financial constraints differentially affect the investment patterns of stand-alone firms and segments within conglomerates. Given the importance of industry structure to investment documented in this study, it seems likely that industry structure would also affect investment of same-firm segments active in different industries. We leave this question as a promising avenue for future research.
This appendix formalizes the link between industry structure and investment sensitivity.
Let x denote the state variable and f(x) define its probability density function. Let I ≡ I(x) stand for investment and ) (n x represent the investment trigger. Let s(x,n) denote the sensitivity of investment to the state variable:
We now show that the probability that a change in the state variable triggers investment depends on industry structure by establishing that the expected sensitivity of investment to the state variable increases with the number of firms in the industry, i.e., with competition.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Reported are summary statistics for firms in low, mid, and high-concentration manufacturing industries, 1981-2000. Industry concentration is measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) compiled by the Census of Manufacturers. Sub-samples reflect DOJ-FTC guidelines: Low-concentration industries (HHI < 1000), mid-concentration industries (1000 ≤ HHI < 1800), and high-concentration industries (HHI ≥ 1800). Firm-level data are from COMPUSTAT. Our proxy for investment is capital expenditures. Our proxy for investment opportunities is Tobin's q (market value of equity plus book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred taxes, divided by the book value of assets). Our proxies for financial status are: cash flow (earnings before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends), cash holdings (cash and marketable securities), financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), and firm size (log of total assets). Our proxies for risk are: cash flow volatility (standard deviation of cash flow divided by assets), diversification (one minus the Herfindahl of sales across the firm's four-digit SIC industries), and the capital-labor ratio (net property, plant, and equipment per employee). HHI statistics reflect industry-years rather than firmyears. Superscripts show significant differences across sub-samples: low versus mid (top panel), mid versus high (middle panel) and low versus high (bottom panel). a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. -799, 800-1999, and 2000+ , and Model C uses cutoffs of 0-1199, 1200-1599, and 1600+. The dependent variable is investment (capital expenditures divided by assets). Our proxy for investment opportunities is Tobin's q (market value of equity plus book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred taxes, divided by the book value of assets). Our proxies for financial status are: cash flow (earnings before extraordinary item and depreciation minus dividends), cash holdings (cash and marketable securities), financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), and firm size (log of total assets). Our proxies for risk are: cash flow volatility (standard deviation of cash flow divided by assets), diversification (one minus the Herfindahl of sales across the firm's four-digit SIC industries), and the capital-labor ratio (net property, plant, and equipment per employee). All regressions control for two-digit industry and year fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-robust Newey-West asymptotic standard errors reported in parentheses. The Δ columns show the statistical significance levels of difference tests across sub-samples: low versus mid (first superscript), mid versus high (second superscript) and low versus high (third superscript). a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. Proportional hazards shift-parameter estimates and baseline hazard rates for three investment thresholds (5%, 10%, and 15%) for low, mid, and high-concentration manufacturing industries, 1981-2000. The dependent variable is the number of years a firm has not exceeded the investment threshold. All variable definitions as in Table 2 , including two-digit industry and year effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Δ5, Δ10, Δ15 superscripts show, for each investment threshold, significant differences across sub-samples: low versus mid (first superscript), mid versus high (second superscript) and low versus high (third superscript). a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. -188,673 -78,927 -39,483 -38,272 -22,681 -9,282 -28,677 -13,552 -7,184 LR test (all β i = 0) Table 6 Proportional Hazards Models -Firm-Specific Investment Thresholds
Low-Concentration Industries
Low-Concentration Industries Mid-Concentration Industries High-Concentration Industries
Low-Concentration Industries
Proportional hazards shift-parameter estimates and baseline hazard rates for three firm-specific investment thresholds (1, 2, and 3 times the firm-median investment rate between 1981 and 2000). The dependent variable is the number of years a firm has not exceeded the investment threshold. All variable definitions as in Table 2 , including two-digit industry and year effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Δ1, Δ2, Δ3 superscripts show, for each investment threshold, significant differences across sub-samples: low versus mid (first superscript), mid versus high (second superscript) and low versus high (third superscript). a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Switchers are firms that enter by changing twodigit SIC. Exiters are firms that appear in the sample in 1981-1990 but not in 1991-2000 . Sellers are firms that exit through asset sales. Incumbents remain in their two-digit SIC and appear at least once in 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Tobin's q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred taxes, divided by the book value of assets. Investment lumpiness is the standard deviation of the investment rate (capital expenditures divided by assets) in the four most recent years. Investment staging is the autocorrelation of the investment rate in the four most recent years. Years to invest is the mean time until investment exceeds a given threshold (5%, 10%, 15%). Leading superscripts show significant differences across sub-samples: low versus mid (top panel), mid versus high (middle panel) and low versus high (bottom panel). Lagging superscripts show tests of differences between entrants and switchers (column 2), incumbents and all other groups (column 3), sellers and exiters (column 4), and entrants and exiters (column 5). a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels. 
